Reflections on Standing: Challenges to Searches and Seizures in a High Technology World by Anderson, José F.
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
Spring 2006
Reflections on Standing: Challenges to Searches
and Seizures in a High Technology World
José F. Anderson
University of Baltimore School of Law, janderson@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Fourth Amendment
Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more
information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reflections on Standing: Challenges to Searches and Seizures in a High Technology World, 75 Miss. L. J. 1099 (2006)
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344516
· MISSISSIPPI 
. LAW JOURNAL 
VOLUME'll) 
REFLECTIONS ON STANDING: CHALLENGES TO 
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY WORLD 
Jose Felipe Anderson 
SPRlNG2006 NUMBER" 
.. 
REFLECTIONS ON STANDING: 
CHALLENGES TO SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES IN A HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
WORLD 
Jose Felipe Anderson * 
''Those who give up essential liberty, to purchase a tem-
porary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety." Benjamin 
Franklin1 
"Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of 
the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we 
need to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery senti-
ment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of 
crime." Judge Learned Hand2 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the profound issues that surround constitutional 
criminal procedure is the obscure often overlooked issue of who 
has standing to challenge an illegal search, seizure or confes-
• Professor of Law and Director, Stephen L. Snyder Center for Litigation 
Skills, University of Baltimore School of Law. Adjunct Professor, University of 
Pennsylvania, Legal Studies and Business Ethics Department, The Wharton 
School; B.A., University of Maryland Baltimore County; J.D., University of Mary-
land School of Law. 
Research funding for this work was underwritten by the National Center for 
Justice and the Rule of Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law, 
which is supported by a grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of 
Justice Programs at the U.S. Department of Justice. The author acknowledges 
Professor Thomas K Clancy, Director of the National Center for Justice and the 
Rule of Law, the faculty and students of the University of Mississippi School of 
Law who attended a lecture and discussion of an earlier draft of this paper, and 
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1 Benjamin Franklin, Reply of the Pennsylvania Assembly to the Governor 
(Nov. 1755), in POWER QUOTES 106 (Daniel B. Baker, ed., 1992). 
• United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
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sion.3 Privacy interests are often overlooked because without a 
legal status that allows a person to complain in court, there is 
no way to challenge whether one is constitutionally protected 
from personal invasions. Standing is that procedural barrier 
often imposed to prevent a person in a case from objecting to 
improper police conduct because of his or her relationship of 
ownership,4 proximity,S location, or interest6 in an item 
searched or a thing seized.7 Although rarely penetrating the 
news headlines, those who work in the day-to-day vineyards of 
3 Standing is the manner in which litigants are allowed into the courthouse 
doors. The Supreme Court has made clear that for a party to qualify to litigate, 
it must demonstrate "first and foremost 'an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est.'" Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992». 
• The Supreme Court has said that privacy expectations have been explained 
by "a source outside the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of 
real or personal property law .... " Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) 
(quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978». Thus, trespassers, for 
example, would have no reasonable expectation of privacy in land that they might 
wrongfully occupy. In Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 
1975), the First Circuit held that squatters had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in structures that they constructed on government-owned land. The court ex-
plained that "[n)othing in the record suggests that the squatters' entry upon the 
land was sanctioned in any way by the commonwealth. . . . That fact alone 
makes ludicrous any claim that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. 
Such limitation in privacy protection may even apply when the initial possession 
of the property is sanctioned. See Laney v. State, 842 A.2d 773 (Md. 2004) (hold-
ing that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy as a holdover mort-
gagor in foreclosed property in which a search was performed and explosives were 
discovered); United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 459 (2d. Cir. 1987) ("[W]hen a ho-
tel guest's rental period has expired or been lawfully terminated, the guest does 
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room . . . ."). But see 
United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that privacy 
expectation may survive if the hotel has a practice of allowing tenants to hold 
over the check out time without consequence.). 
• See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that privacy inter-
est was affected by the actual location of trash awaiting pick up outside a private 
residence). Rights might be affected by whether the trash is located on the pri-
vate or public portion of the property. 
6 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (privacy in personal closed 
containers); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (some privacy protection in 
the contents of private desk in a government office). 
7 See United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (dis-
cussing reasonable expectation of privacy in fIles stored on the hard drive of a 
personal computer). 
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the criminal justice system well know the power of this concept 
that often is the difference between who may complain about 
an egregious privacy wrong and who may not.8 Standing is the 
keeper of the constitutional gate; and for defense attorneys its 
presence is not unlike the mythical Cerberus which guards the 
gates of hell9 and will require a Herculean effort to over-
come. 10 
Newsworthy stories of obviously guilty criminals going free 
because of the constable's blunder have often lead to cries for 
sometimes extreme criminal justice reform. 11 But the frequen-
cy of such rulings as compared to the political attention they 
receive does not accurately reflect the difficulty of a defendant 
prevailing on an issue where the "exclusionary rule" is actually 
invoked.12 The concept of standing however plays into not only 
who can seek the protection of the courts, but how those laws 
are challenged and interpreted by trial and appellate courtS.13 
The procedural doctrine acts as a constitutional gatekeeper 
that determines who may articulate arguments on the merits of 
their constitutional privacy claims. Like all procedural tools 
8 Courts simply do not decide every dispute presented to them. Indeed, con-
siderations of judicial efficiency would logically suggest that courts, like any insti-
tution, would desire to reduce their workload by imposing administrative tools to 
filter matters deemed inappropriate. 
• Cerberus, a creature from Greek mythology, was a three headed dog that 
guarded the entrance to Hades. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA II READY REFER-
ENCE 691 (1976). 
10 Hercules, another mythical figure, had to subdue Cerberus as one of his 
twelve labors. See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 1167 (2d ed. 1957). 
11 The oft noted query, whether "[tjhe criminal is to go free because the con-
stable has blundered," was formulated by Benjamin Cardozo while a judge on the 
New York Court of Appeals rejecting adoption of the exclusionary rule. See New 
York v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 586-89 (N.Y. 1926). 
12 The exclusionary rule is a judicially created doctrine that prevents evidence 
from being admitted into court that has been obtained in violation of a 
defendant's constitutional rights. It has been criticized as barring "probative evi-
dence that the police are judged, often on the sheerest technicality, to have ob-
tained improperly." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GoMORRAH: MODERN 
LmERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 104 (1996). 
13 See generally 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 11.3 (4th ed. 
2004). 
1102 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75 
their functional value is in providing some efficiency and pre-
dictability to the system, so that courts may only resolve dis-
putes properly before them.14 Efficiency is an important value, 
but when the balance between efficiency and protecting funda-
mental rights tips too far toward strict adherence to process it 
may well be time to examine whether the rule needs to be 
modified. 15 
As we enter the twenty-first century with a notable in-
crease in technology, greater concerns for security brought 
about by terrorist activity, most notably the tragedy of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, examination of the fundamental doctrine that 
protects our privacy is necessary. IS Assumptions about how 
well those rules operate in the current climate of emerging 
technology, high crime, and terrorism concerns should be reex-
amined. We should be sure that the circumstances of a chang-
ing world do not lead to the long term application of legal prin-
ciples ill-suited to the demands of a new era. 17 
,. See Mary 1. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the 
Rights of Relationship, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1593 (1987). 
15 See Melvin Gutterman, Fourth Amendment Privacy and Standing: "Wherever 
the Twain Shall Meet," 60 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1981). 
18 The tragedy this nation experienced on September 11, 2001, resulting in 
the loss of 3,000 lives from terrorist activity, created a renewed desire to investi-
gate crime before it occurs by using whatever investigative techniques might be 
available. 
17 The most familiar area of electronic intrusion that courts have addressed is 
wiretapping. But such surveillance, that is, listening in secret, is an ancient prac-
tice. As one court has recently explained: 
Eavesdropping is an ancient practice which at common law was con-
demned as a nuisance. At one time the eavesdropper listened by naked 
ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls 
seeking out private discourse. The awkwardness and undignified manner 
of this method as well as its susceptibility to abuse was immediately 
recognized. Electricity, however, provided a better vehicle and with the 
advent of the telegraph surreptitious interception of messages began. As 
early as 1862[,] California found it necessary to prohibit the practice by 
statute. During the Civil War general J.E.B. Stewart is reputed to have 
had his own eavesdropper along with him in the field whose job it was 
to intercept military communications of the opposing forces. . . . 
The telephone brought on a new and more modern eavesdropper 
known as the 'wiretapper.' Interception was made by a connection with a 
telephone line. 
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The purpose of this article is to examine some fundamental 
principles of standing as they relate to other privacy issues. 
Many of these concerns have been ignored by contemporary 
courts as the technology that affects privacy interests has 
marched forward at a break-neck pace. IS The rules of standing 
as currently applied will lead to unduly restrictive access to 
challenging government conduct effecting privacy interests. 19 
Furthermore, the standing rules as currently applied have 
lead to the development of faulty doctrine in the area of the 
exclusionary rule, which affects Fourth Amendment rights in 
general. 20 Opinions that are both illogical and difficult to ap-
ply have resulted from current standing rules, and both defense 
and prosecution interests have suffered from the poorly crafted 
jurisprudence that has resulted.21 The ill-conceived jurispru-
Kopko v. Miller, 842 A.2d 1028, 1034 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (quoting Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1967». 
18 One insightful commentator has recognized that the "advent of widespread 
use of computer technology . . . has altered the way in which individuals view 
the world .... Today, lawyers and business professionals must be cognizant of 
communications law, criminal law, privacy law, and many other subjects that may 
not have been relevant to their situation only a decade ago." RAYMOND T. 
NIMMER, THE LAw OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, LICENSES, LIABILITIES, JIl-
l (2d ed. 1992). 
19 The need for courts to impose procedural rules like standing requirements 
is a continuing reminder that courts are functioning organizations which have 
their own regulatory concerns. Rules like statutes of limitations and fIling dead-
lines serve to advance goals other than those achieved by deciding a case on its 
merits. 
20 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, support-
ed by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
21 See generally CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL Jus-
TICE 201 (1978). 
Repealing the so called "exclusionary rule" would not make the police 
any more effective in their "war" against crime. Despite loud and fre-
quent complaints, the police have not been handcuffed by the rulings of 
the Warren Court. Except for minor drug offenses, there is no evidence 
to suggest that policemen make fewer arrests, or that prosecutors secure 
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dence of standing will clearly continue if broader, more predict-
able, rules of standing are not developed to meet the challenges 
of our high technology age.22 Indeed, it is my belief that the 
poorly reasoned and outdated Fourth Amendment precedent, 
combined with the rapid increase in intrusive technology, cre-
ates a dangerous lack of checks and balances in privacy pro-
tection and the public's ability to adequately respond.23 
I propose that standing rules need to be expanded in some 
areas and clarified in others.24 Specifically, in a world where 
video surveillance is increasingly in use,25 it makes sense to 
apply liberal standing rules to those circumstances.26 Further-
more, the concept of standing needs to be clarified as related to 
the seizure of items from electronic databases to insure proper 
development of Fourth Amendment law. 27 
Recent attempts by the federal government to assist law 
enforcement by relaxing requirements for investigating alleged 
fewer convictions, because of Supreme Court decisions safeguarding the 
rights of the accused; on the contrary, the evidence runs the other way. 
[d. at 201 (footnotes omitted). 
22 "In time, given the global movement toward democracy, interactive voice, 
audio, video data exchange will occur world wide. . . . In addition to fiber optics, 
dozens of other technological innovations will end our dependency on the electro-
magnetic spectrum." JONATHAN w. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 308 (1991). 
23 In human terms the value of privacy is high but difficult to measure and 
constantly evolving. "Political, social and economic changes entail the recognition 
of new rights, and the common law, in its eternal youth, grows to meet the de-
mands of society. . . . [TJhe right to be let alone . . . has grown to comprise 
every form of possession-intangible, as well as tangible. Samuel D. Warren & 
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 193 (1890). 
24 It is not my goal to make courts the clearinghouse for all personal privacy 
matters; rather, I suggest that courts are in the best position to evaluate new 
technology as it emerges. 
26 Consider, as an example of intrusion, the use of red light cameras, which 
has emerged over the last decade. Currently, the surveillance method is so com-
mon that we are no longer surprised by the mailed notices capturing our vehicle 
and often a passenger, the time of violation, and our exact location at a camera 
equipped intersection. 
26 Ail a society, if we value privacy, we should not make ourselves vulnerable 
to rapid technological change that will tum our privacy privilege to a right with-
out a remedy . 
., See MILLER, infra note 184. 
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terrorism under the Patriot Aces have brought the issue of 
government surveillance to the attention of an anxious nation 
that wants both freedom and security.29 Indeed, Congress and 
the executive branch continue to struggle with what level of 
intrusion is necessary to insure security.30 There has also been 
legislative action on the state level to address the problem of 
police access to high technology in investigating crime after 
September 11, 2001.31 Groups calling for more concern for the 
protection of privacy have also raised concerns that privacy 
28 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). One federal 
court had this comment about the law: 
The passage of the Patriot Act altered and to some degree muddied 
the landscape. In October 2001, Congress amended FISA [Foreign Sur-
veillance Intelligence Act) to change "the purpose" language. . . . It also 
added a provision allowing "Federal Officers who conduct electronic sur-
veillance to acquire foreign intelligence information'" to "consult with fed-
eral law enforcement officers to coordinate efforts to investigate or pro-
tect against" attack or other grave hostile acts, sabotage or international 
terrorism, or clandestine intelligence activities, by foreign powers or their 
agents. 
In re: Sealed Case Nos. 02-001, 02-002, 310 F.3d 717, 728-29 (2002). 
29 See FIONA DOHERTY ET AL., LAWYER'S COMMITrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, A 
YEAR OF Loss: REEXAMINING CIVIL LIBERTIES SINCE SEPl'EMBER 11, 11 (2002). 
The Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights has expressed a great deal of concern 
about changes, announced on May 30, 2002 by Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
concerning the FBI guidelines on criminal investigations and citizen surveillance. 
Id. 
Id. 
Under the Attorney General's new guidelines, FBI agents may once 
again monitor and investigate lawful political and religious activities. 
FBI agents can now keep records of people who attend places of wor-
ship--mosques, synagogues, and churches-as well as those who attend 
meetings of non-governmental groups. To do this, they may covertly 
attend political or religious gatherings, surf internet sites, and mine com-
mercial databases. Furthermore, they can do all of this without showing 
any reason to suspect any criminal activity. . . . In addition, there is no 
time limit on how long the information may be retained. 
30 See generally id. at 7-12. The USA Patriot Act was passed only a few 
weeks after the tragedy of September 11, 2001. Accordingly, it did not receive the 
normal scrutiny as if it had gone through the complete legislative process. Id. at 
1-2. 
31 The American Civil Liberties Union has been actively involved in examining 
the provisions of the USA Patriot Act. 
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rights are being unfairly curtailed.32 
The creation of an office of homeland security33 and the 
continuing war on terrorism34 have made citizens of the Unit-
ed States acutely aware that notions of privacy are being chal-
lenged in ways unknown to prior generations.35 By clarifying 
the role that standing plays in the constitutional equation, we 
may be able to create a more efficient and predictable system 
to review the uses of privacy technology. 
STANDING AS A CONSTITUTIONAL GATEKEEPER: 
CIVIL STANDING AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
In order to properly fashion adequate rules of standing in 
constitutional criminal procedure, it is useful to explore how 
standing has developed in civil litigation for civil rights.36 
aa The Council on American-Islamic Relations Research Center has recently 
described the problem of civil rights challenges faced by Muslims in a post Sep, 
tember 11th world. Reporting a 64 percent increase in anti-Muslim sentiment 
since the fall of the world trade center, the Council's executive summary explains, 
The fallout from September 11 continues to impact Muslim daily life, 
whether at school, in the workplace or in general public encounters. 
Mistreatment at the hand of federal government personnel continue to 
be reported in substantial numbers. FBI agents and other local law 
enforcement authorities have sometimes responded to hearsay reports, 
and conducted questionable raids and interrogations. . . . Also, many 
Muslim homes and businesses were raided and private property seized 
pending investigation. Moreover, queries by some FBI agents about 
mosque membership list and media reports about a proposed FBI count-
ing of mosques raised widespread apprehensions among community mem-
bers who believe they are being scrutinized based on their religious 
association. 
Guilt By Association-The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 2003, 
CAl R, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS RESEARCH CENTER 1 (2003). 
33 See John Gibeaut, Winds of Change, 87 ABA J. 32 (Nov. 2001) (discussing 
the creation of an office of homeland security). 
34 [d. 
35 The right to be let alone by government officials unless there exists suffi-
cient cause is protected by the Fourth Amendment. This right is "perhaps the 
most personal of all legal principles. It is also one of the newest, since only the. 
more sophisticated of societies have the interest and the ability to nurture that 
subtle and most personal possession of man, his dignity." MORRIS L. ERNST & 
ALAN U. SCHWARTZ, PRNACY, THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALoNE 1 (1962). 
36 See generally Roy L. BROOKS ET AL., CNIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, CASES AND 
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There are many analogies between civil rights civil litigation 
and the assertion of constitutional criminal rights.37 For exam-
ple, each rests largely on the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to enforce various rights against state govern-
ments.38 Both are based on concepts of personal freedom and 
autonomy and individual fundamental rights.39 Both types of 
cases may lead to precedent that apply to large classes of other 
litigants. Finally, both civil and criminal individual rights 
claims are based on the notion that government must be just 
when it uses its power against individuals.40 The government 
may not simply go about its business as a routine law break-
er.41 To sanction such government behavior would lead to dis-
respect for the rule of law.42 When government becomes a law-
breaker, the dissatisfaction of those who are governed some-
times leads to drastic changes like in our own American revolu-
PERSPECTIVES, 9-13, 48-50 (2d ed. Carolina Academic Press 2000). Civil Rights 
cases have been the primary work of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP) during the flrst part of the twentieth cen-
tury. Id. Using the courts to protect personal rights was a new concept at that 
period in American jurisprudence. Id. 
37 Most civil rights litigation has an effect on a broad range of citizens rather 
than a purely private dispute. 
38 Like other individual rights found in the Federal Constitution, the incorpo-
ration doctrine makes many of those rights fundamental and fully applicable to 
government action of the several states. 
39 The Fourth Amendment reflects critical values. "Indeed, these rights are so 
strong that the Constitution prohibits the most minimal transgressions against 
them .... Personal security, liberty, and private property are not discrete inter-
ests; they unite to deflne signillcant attributes of individual freedom in the de-
mocracY." Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Pri-
vacy, Property and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 576 
(1996) . 
.. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 991 (1987) ("Constitutional law provides a set of peremptory 
norms-a checking power-that is basic to the American notion of a government 
of limited powers."). 
U United States v. Berger, 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
'2 Government cannot be a law-breaker; judicial review of police conduct 
serves to enforce that principle. "(H]aving judges decide what police conduct vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment reflects a distrust of society's ability or willingness 
to apply the Fourth Amendment properly." George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pol-
lack, Saving Rights from a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 
B.U. L. REV. 147, 149 (1993). 
1108 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75 
tion.43 
Our system of criminal justice should also re-examine 
doctrine when new rules will encourage government to advance 
its goal to protect privacy values which contribute to the quali-
ty of life, even though the need for higher security may exist.44 
The concept that a litigant in court needs an interest in the 
litigation to challenge the conduct of a party in a suit is not a 
new concept.45 In civil litigation, standing rules prevent courts 
from deciding issues on behalf of parties that have no stake in 
a legal dispute.46 As a matter of civil procedure, standing rules 
are crafted to uphold the legal principal that courts are for the 
purpose of resolving actual, as opposed to hypothetical, dis-
putes.47 
Courts do not make themselves available to give advisory 
opinions on rights and remedies, and standing rules are one of 
the tools they use to ignore the merits of many disputes.48 The 
4S "Advances in science and technology recurrently exert pressure on the scope 
and meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but the privacy and security protected by 
the Fourth Amendment should not depend on innovations and technology. . . . 
During the Framers' era, the home was the focal point of privacy and personal 
security." Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment 
Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MISS. L.J. 51 (2002) (footnotes omitted). 
"When the American Republic was founded, the framers established a libertarian 
equilibrium among the competing values of privacy, disclosure and surveillance." 
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 67 (1967). 
.. See supra note 4. 
45 Standing in civil cases is often based on the injury sustained. In 
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923), the Supreme Court held that a 
taxpayer who objected to the federal government giving grants to the states to 
fund a reduction in infant mortality did not have standing to sue. She claimed 
the grants would increase her tax liability. [d. at 486. The Court reasoned that 
she had no immediate danger or direct injury from the government action. [d. 
46 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that a taxpayer would have 
standing to oppose the Federal Aid to Education Act on establishment clause 
grounds if they can show a logical nexus between the status of the taxpayer and 
the claim; the Court reasoned that the specific constitutional limitation of govern-
ment support for religion provided a sufficient nexus). 
47 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (holding that general 
standing as a citizen does not establish enough direct injury to me suit). 
4' Generally, the cases and controversies requirement of Article III, Section 2 
limits review of hypothetical questions by the court and prohibits the federal 
court from issuing advisory opinions. Such a rule assures that courts will decide 
only focused and specific conflicts between adversaries. See United States v. 
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obvious reason for avoiding such intervention as a routine 
matter is to preserve the division of governmental responsi-
bility. Courts decide disputes while legislatures craft law. The 
balance of power dictates that courts should confine their role 
to the decision-making necessary to keep the peace.49 Occa-
sionally, a court my render some guidance on such tangential 
matters, but such opinions are clearly the exception to the 
general, well-settled rule.50 
In the context of civil litigation, the doctrine of standing, 
ripeness,51 and case and controversr2 have stood as a barrier 
to the courts from aggressively making law without benefit of a 
plaintiff. These rules leave to the legislative and executive 
branches of government the responsibility of creating desirable 
policies for addressing societal problems that are not in the ad-
versarial position needed for court based dispute resolution. 53 
Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146 (1961). 
49 Resolving disputes peacefully includes the judiciary's interest in reaching a 
decision which is also fmal between the parties. See Chicago & S. Airlines v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). 
60 The Supreme Court has occasionally reviewed cases when they might other-
wise be moot because the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See, 
e.g., S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 514 
(1911). 
51 See United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1975) (holding 
that federal public employees wishing to challenge the Federal Hatch Act, which 
prohibited certain types of political activity, had no standing because the issue 
was not yet ripe; the workers did not describe the acts in which they wanted to 
engage). 
&2 The case and controversy requirement is a doctrine which courts invoke to 
avoid deciding certain types of matters describing them as either not ripe or 
moot. As one scholar has cogently explained: 
The mootness doctrine is derived from the Article ill prohibition against 
federal courts issuing advisory or declaratory opinions where no active 
controversy exists. If there is no longer an active controversy between 
adverse parties then the case should be found moot. One exception to 
the mootness doctrine is the voluntary cessation exception. Under this 
exception, voluntary cessation of the improper behavior by one party will 
not cause the case to be dismissed if the party is free to return to the 
behavior at any time. 
Marc M. Harrold, Stripping Away at the First Amendment:The Increasing Paternal 
Voice of Our Living Constitution, 32 U. MEM. L. REv. 403, 423 (2002) (footnotes 
omitted). 
53 I do not intend to suggest that legislative role in protecting privacy is not 
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Such challenges were often faced where litigants attempted to 
bring actions to court during the civil rights era. 54 Lawyers 
from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People constantly faced these barriers when it attempted to 
bring progressive civil rights reforms to the nation through use 
of the court system. 55 The need for aggrieved plaintiffs never 
ended, particularly in cases that would take years, sometimes 
decades, to resolve in the litigation process.56 
In the famous case of Brown v. Board of Education57 for 
example, the litigation that ultimately lead to the landmark 
Supreme Court decision was actually several law suits with 
many plaintiffs from several jurisdictions.58 The cases were 
developed simultaneously so that at least one of them would 
survive to the nation's highest court. The strategy finally 
worked, but the lawyers lost many litigants along the way. 59 
In other civil rights litigation like NAACP v. Alabama,60 
essential. In the same way courts are likely to address more privacy issues, legis-
latures should be alert to respond to privacy concerns where there is consensus 
that such intrusions should be regulated. 
54 During early civil rights litigation, sometimes courts would seek ways to 
dismiss "separate but equal" claims on any basis possible. In one instance, the 
legendary Thurgood Marshall, serving as chief counsel for the NAACP during the 
1950's, had a case dismissed in South Carolina because the parent of the child 
who sought school bus services paid his property taxes in a county different from 
the county where the only available "colored" school was located. RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 3-17 (1976). In planning to file a new case, Marshall 
announced that he would seek a "firm, unified group of twenty plaintiffs" to pre-
vent dismissal on a technicality based on standing. Id. at 18. 
66 Civil Rights litigation required filing a number of cases in different jurisdic-
tions. In 1951, for example, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers travelled 
72,000 miles litigating Civil Rights cases. See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN 
THE COURTS 81 (1994). 
66 The litigation strategy to overturn the Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896), separate but equal doctrine required a litigation strategy which took de-
cades to accomplish through a series of Supreme Court cases. See KLUGER, supra 
note 54. 
67 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
68 Id. at 486. Brown was actually a consolidation of five cases from not only 
Kansas, but also Delaware; South Carolina; Washington, D.C.; and Virginia. 
69 Those who participated in the cases would often be threatened financially 
with refusal of credit and farm Bupplies if they filed civil rights suits. See 
KLUGER, supra note 54. 
60 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court held that the civil 
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issues of standing again confronted the Supreme Court as it 
struggled to fashion fair rules to permit constitutional rights to 
be properly determined by the court without the interference of 
procedural barrier.61 The Court properly recognized that there 
is something about civil rights litigation that distinguishes it 
from ordinary cases and controversies and allows the Court to 
resolve purely private matters.62 
CRIMINAL STANDING: UNSTABLE ORIGINS 
From the very beginning of challenges to police conduct on 
constitutional grounds one of the primary issues has been who 
gets to complain.63 In the early 1900's, the Supreme Court re-
solved a dispute on that issue in Weeks u. United States.64 The 
Supreme Court recognized the need to establish an 
exclusionary rule to prohibit illegally seized evidence from 
being introduced at trial.65 Although Weeks was not a stand-
ing case, it illustrated the direction the litigation on police 
intrusion would take in the decades to come.66 Thereafter, the 
rights organization did not have to disclose its membership list because "privacy 
in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation 
of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." 
Id. at 462. Implicit in the holding is that the unnamed members had standing to 
assert their protected association rights. 
61 The barriers to civil rights litigation was not restricted merely to procedural 
matters, but also extended to threats of violence. "In making trips to southern 
court houses, there were many close calls. Threats of lynching, assault and mur-
der were routine." CARL ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS 7 (1993). 
62 However, the Supreme Court has also denied standing based upon minority 
group status. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (parents of black school 
children who sued the IRS claiming that discriminatory private schools should not 
receive tax exempt status were denied standing). The Court ruled that such "stig-
matizing injury" was not enough to confer status on the parents. Id. at 738. In 
some instances a civil rights organization should be permitted to serve as a "pri-
vate attorney general" for purpose of litigating civil rights actions. HARRy 
KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE 1ST AMENDMENT 80 (1965) (quoting Comment, 
Private Attorneys-General: Group Action in the Fight for Civil Liberties, 58 YALE 
L.J. 574, 581-89 (1949). 
63 Police have always relied on sources of information that they may have 
come about by practices they could not engage in themselves. 
64 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
65 Id. at 392. 
66 See T.S.L. Perlman, Due Process and the Admissibility of Evidence, 64 
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court struggled with the relationship between federal and state 
criminal justice investigations and how to best conduct them.67 
The key issues often centered around the exclusionary rule 
which had been recognized by the Supreme Court in Weeks but 
had not been adopted in many stateS.68 Thus, in states that 
did not provide the remedy of exclusion of the evidence, police 
were free to engage in misconduct without fear that they would 
loose any evidence at trial.69 
It was not until Wolf v. Colorado70 in 1949 that the Court 
recognized that illegal state searches may violate the Federal 
Constitution, but the Court was unwilling at that time to apply 
the exclusionary rule to the states.71 In an opinion by Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, the Court rejected the adoption of a national 
exclusionary rule to be applied; instead, the Court suggested 
that civil law suits and other local checks on police would suf-
fice. 72 This conclusion was hotly disputed by Justice Murphy 
in his dissenting opinion.73 
This ideological battle over the proper remedy for police 
violation of the Fourth Amendment has had an enormous im-
pact on the development of principles related to standing.74 
HARV. L. REV. 1304 (1951) . 
•• [d . 
.. [d. 
.. Almost two decades after the exclusionary rule had been adopted in Mapp, 
President Ronald Reagan established a commission which recommended it be 
abolished. In its report, the task force explained: 
Legislation should be proposed and enacted to abolish the exclusionary 
rule as it is applied to Fourth Amendment issues. 
. . . Anyone evaluating the exclusionary rule must constantly keep this 
basic premise in mind. The Framers of the Constitution did not create 
the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment. They 
could have done so. . . . The exclusionary rule is instead a judicially 
created rule of procedure that fails to serve the goals it seeks, and fails 
at a tremendous cost. 
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT 24-25 (1982). 
•• 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
71 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 31 . 
• 2 [d . 
• 3 [d. at 42 (Murphy, J., dissenting) . 
•• [d. 
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That is because if reluctance to impose the severe sanction of 
exclusion is present in a court's analysis of Fourth Amendment 
claims, then it might be tempted to seek limitations on stand-
ing to avoid rendering favorable relief to a criminal defen-
dant.75 When there was no exclusionary rule, there was little 
need to erect complicated standing principles because there 
was no fear that evidence would be excluded from consider-
ation.76 The absence of standing cases in the Fourth Amend-
ment arena prior to Mapp v.Ohio77 may well be explained by 
the absence of the exclusionary sanction in state courts. 
Prior to Mapp, the Supreme Court had little trouble con-
cluding that the government could not use illegal practices 
against an individual with no standing in order to obtain evi-
dence against another defendant.78 In McDonald v. United 
States,79 the Court held that a co-defendant had the right to 
76 AB one scholar has observed: 
The rules or "legal technicalities," as they are sometimes called by per-
sons disgusted with a particular outcome, are not devised solely with an 
eye to ascertaining guilt or punishing the guilty; that could be expedi-
tiously with the thumbscrew and very efficiently and inexpensively in 
our pharmacological age with one sort of drug or another .... The rea-
son for this is not hard to fmd. The forms of due process may protect 
the criminal, but, more importantly, they also protect the innocent. 
WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 185 (1987). 
76 It was not until Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), that the Su-
preme Court recognized the exclusionary rule in federal trials barring the use of 
illegally seized evidence. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. 
n 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
78 
It has long been the case, however, that nearly all claims to enforce 
constitutional rights may be raised only by those who have "standing" to 
assert them. The Fourth Amendment is no exception to this principle. 
That is, a person who makes a motion to suppress evidence that the 
government intends to use against him at trial must show that he was 
"a victim of search or seizure . . . directed at someone else." 
In short, Fourth Amendment rights are personal. They may not 
vicariously be asserted. 
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 355 (3d ed. 2002) (foot-
notes omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960), overruled 
on other grounds, United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980». 
79 335 U.S. 451 (1948). 
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complain about searches of his alleged accomplices.so The Su-
preme Court, however, backed away from McDonald's defen-
dant-friendly principle in Wong Sun v. United States81 and AL-
derman v. United States.82 
Clearly, a plausible explanation for the erosion of the so-
called derivative standing rule83 is the Court's application of 
the exclusionary principle adopted in Mapp. The controversy 
that generated from the Court's incorporation of the 
exclusionary rule led to an inflammatory national debate about 
the Warren Court's criminal justice jurisprudence.84 
Limitations on standing merely served to ease the blow of 
the Mapp decision which was seen as another liberal opinion of 
a defendant-friendly Supreme COurt.85 Indeed, the criticism of 
the Warren Court became quite severe by legal scholars.86 
80 McDonald, 335 U.S. at 456. 
81 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
82 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
83 See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (overruling sub silentio the notion of deriv-
ative standing). 
84 As early as the 1950's, Chief Justice Earl Warren was criticized for being 
soft on crime by other members of his profession. "The Conference of State Chief 
Justices in 1958 went so far as to pass a resolution condemning the Warren 
Court for its erosion of federalism and its tendency 'to adopt the role of 
policymaker without proper judicial restraint.'" DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: 
THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS 306-07 (1986). 
85 One commentator poses the question about the effectiveness of the Warren 
Court in this way: 
Did the Warren courtrs] criminal justice decisions have any real 
effect on the behavior of police? Some have suggested that the criminal 
justice decisions were a failure. It has been argued that while some Su-
preme Court decisions have resulted in allowing concededly guilty defen-
dants to go free, there has been no demonstrable beneficial change in 
police practices. 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURsUIT OF JUSTICE 96 (1998). 
88 
Eminent scholars from many fields have commented upon the [Warren 
Court's] tendency towards over-generalization, the disrespect for prece-
dent, even those of recent vintage, the needless obscurity of opinions, the 
discouraging lack of candor, the disdain for the fact finding of the lower 
courts, the tortured reading of statutes, and the seeming absence of 
neutrality and objectivity. 
Milton Handler, The Supreme Court and the Antitrust Laws: A Critic's View Point, 
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After Mapp, the Gideon V, Wainwright87 decision was yet 
to come, imposing the cost of court appointed counsel on the 
State to enforce these newly recognized constitutional rights. 88 
Later in the decade, the Court would again borrow from well-
established federal investigative practice and require state 
police to give warning to criminal suspects in the historic deci-
sion of Miranda v. Arizona.89 Miranda again spurred the na-
tional debate about the Warren Court's criminal justice poli-
cies.90 
Three years later, the Supreme Court dealt the first of 
several sever blows to the Fourth Amendment in Alderman v. 
State 91when it held that granting standing to Alderman 
would "encroach[] upon the public interest in prosecuting those 
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the 
basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.,,92 As one 
insightful commentator has noted, "[e]ssentially, the standing 
requirement is the Supreme Court's declaration that the cost of 
the exclusionary rule can become too great to bear.,,93 
Rather than a mere procedural requirement, Alderman 
triggered an era where standing became a substantive limita-
tion on the right to assert a violation of personal privacy.94 At 
a time when the Court was recognizing new zones of privacy 
like in Roe v. Wade95 and Griswold v. Connecticut,96 the 
Court was expressing its preference for privacy in broad con-
texts. 97 
1 GA. L. REV. 339, 350 (1967). 
87 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
88 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-44. 
89 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
90 The Miranda opinion was greatly criticized by some legal scholars. See, e.g., 
Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph 
Over Substance and Reason, 24 AM.CRIM. L. REv. 243 (1987). 
91 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
92 Alderman, 394 U.S. at 175. 
93 DRESSLER, supra note 78, at 359. 
94 [d. at 301-302. 
95 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
96 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
97 See, e.g., id.; Thornburgh v. Am. CoIl. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 772 (1986) ("Our cases long have recognized that the Constitution em-
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KATZ, SMITH AND 'RAKAs: RECONCILING STANDING AND 
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
Perhaps the most familiar phrase in all Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is the "reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.'19S Unfortunately, it explains little, leaves many questions 
unanswered and presents one of the greatest constitutional 
moving targets of all time.99 This is particularly true in our 
high technology age. loo This is an amazing legacy of a word 
that has been in the constitutional lexicon for less than four de-
cades. IOI 
It may be that "reasonable expectation of privacy" is an 
utterly undeterminable phrase since it requires any interpreter 
of its provisions to first define the audience to which its words 
apply.l02 In the midst of this confusion, both the rules of pri-
vacy protection under the Fourth Amendment and the doctrine 
of standing have become hopelessly tangled together. 103 
Ironically, it was a case that favored the defendant which 
began the faulty framework for the standing problem that 
plagues the current Supreme Court jurisprudence. In Katz v. 
United States,I°4 the Court held that the government illegally 
bodies a promise that a certain private sphere of individual liberty will be kept 
largely beyond the reach of government. "). 
98 A reasonable expectation of privacy is the legal determination of the sub-
stantive Fourth Amendment right to privacy. It has the practical effect of estab-
lishing when the right may be asserted. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 
(1984) (holding that prisoners have no legitimate reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the contents of their jail cells). 
99 When one speaks of vague concepts like "reasonable" and "expectation," 
interpretation is necessarily broad since these ideas are subjective even when an 
attempt at reaching group consensus is attempted. [d. at 525. 
100 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
102 "In Orwell's society, there was no right of privacy or expectation of privacy. 
In our society, privacy is highly valued and some legal rights of privacy do exist. 
Yet privacy, in the sense of being able to control information about oneself, is 
also an eroding condition." M. ETHAN KATSH, LAw IN A DIGITAL WORLD 227-28 
(1995) (footnote omitted). 
103 See, e.g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (standing and search 
and seizure are concepts that are difficult to separate). 
104 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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intruded on a telephone conversation by attaching an electronic 
listening and recording device to the outside of a public tele-
phone booth. 105 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on several cir-
cumstances that would be difficult to duplicate today.106 The 
Court reasoned that the intrusion on the incriminating tele-
phone call was improper because once Katz placed the fee in 
the phone and closed the door he created a setting where he 
did not expect to be overheard. 107 
The majority's opinion written by Justice Potter Stewart 
rested on the curious and unnecessarily restrictive statement 
that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.,,10B 
106 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 
(1928), the Supreme Court approved wiretapping, concluding that it did not 
amount to a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In one of the 
most famous dissenting opinions in American history, Justice Louis Brandeis 
prophesied: 
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of 
espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be 
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from se-
cret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be en-
abled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
106 When you consider how technology makes issues obsolete, Katz itself pro-
vides an ironic example. At the time of the decision, telephone booths were com· 
mono Currently, few people make calls from an enclosed telephone booth. 
107 An important aspect of electronic searches is their potential scope. They are 
not merely limited to information or historical facts, but permit access to discov-
ering future events. As one commentator explained: 
The conventional search is limited to a designated thing in be-
ing--()ne of a finite number of things to be found in the place where the 
search is to be conducted, and ordinarily discoverable in a single brief 
visit. On the other hand, electronic surveillance is a quest for something 
which may happen in the future. Its effectiveness normally depends upon 
a protracted period of lying-in-wait. For however long that may be, the 
lives and thoughts of many people-not merely the immediate target but 
all who chance to wander into the web--are exposed to an unknown and 
undiscriminating intruder. Such a search has no channel and is certain 
to be far more pervasive and intrusive than a properly conducted search 
for a specific, tangible object at a deimed location. 
Ralph S. Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance By Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in 
Opposition, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 189 (1969). 
108 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
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He also stated that the Fourth Amendment could not be trans-
lated into a general constitutional right to privacy.I09 Stewart, 
however, ultimately rested his decision on the proposition that 
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protect-
ed."llo 
However, it was in John Marshall Harlan's concurring 
opinion that it was first articulated that a person has a "rea-
sonable expectation of privacy" in certain activities.111 He de-
scribed what he believed were the two components necessary to 
establish such a privacy right. First, the person must have 
exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy. 112 Sec-
ond, the individual must establish that it was an expectation 
"society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'1l3 
109 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
110 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citation omitted). 
111 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
112 [d. What we feel is private from others is based not only on our perception 
of whether we are in a secure setting, but how interested we believe others may 
be in what we are doing. 
113 [d. One Fourth Amendment historian has explained that the: 
Amendment provides that if there be a search and seizure it must be a 
reasonable one. The only absolute standard that is set is as to the es-
sentials of the warrant when such is necessary, as it is in most cases. 
The purpose of the latter part of the Amendment of course is to safe-
guard against the general warrant and it does this in two ways: fll'st, by 
prescribing the requirement of probable cause, necessarily peculiar to uh 
case; and second by making requisite the description of the particular 
place to be searched, the person apprehended, and the objects to be 
seized.These requirements limit the scope of each warrant; they take the 
decision as to what may not be done out of the hands of the officer who 
is to execute the warrant, and place it with the more trustworthy and 
sober judgment of a judicial officer. It is for the latter to pass upon the 
merits of the allegations and, on the basis of evidence having behind it 
the responsibility of an oath, to decide whether there is reasonable justi-
fication for this exceptional proceeding in invasion of the individual's 
privacy, and thus to determine what particular actions are justified on 
the basis of this showing. There is no temptation for the ministerial 
officer to exceed the authority which the magistrate decides to give him, 
for he not only thereby subjects himself to civil and criminal liability but 
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It is difficult to establish Harlan's motivation for crafting 
such an ambitious and comprehensive search and seizure test. 
He afforded little justification for his new analysis and did not 
discuss some basic issues, like the potential impact of future 
technology on the reasonable expectations of persons seeking to 
keep a wide range of activities private.1l4 Indeed, Harlan's 
heavy reliance on expectations may have begun the process of 
lowering the mark of Fourth Amendment protection from a 
somewhat fixed, stable set of privacy expectations based on 
property rights into a prohibition against government intrusion 
that shifts as governments' ability to intrude becomes improved 
by technology. 115 
gains no advantage over the accused and merely wastes his efforts. 
NELSON B. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 120 (1937). 
114 One scholar has noted that the historical analysis of the Fourth Amend-
ment has been somewhat unpredictable. 
[T]he Court has at times employed a non-historical analysis to interpret 
the commands of the Fourth Amendment. It has asserted that law en-
forcement practices are not "frozen" by those in place at the time the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted. Hence, interpretation of the Amend-
ment permits modern developments: "Crime has changed, as have the 
means of law enforcement, and it would therefore be naive to assume 
that those actions a constable could take in an English or Americar. 
village three centuries ago should necessarily govern what we, as a so-
ciety, now regard as proper." Thus, the court has sometimes asserted 
that the Amecdment's "prohibition against 'unreasonable searches and 
seizures' must be interpreted 'in light of contemporary norms and condi-
tions.m 
Thomas K Clancy, What Constitutes an "Arrest" Within the Meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, 48 VILL. L. REv. 129, 184 (2003) (quoting Steagald v. United States, 
451 U.S. 204, 217 n.10 (1981» (footnotes omitted). 
"6 The ability of government to intrude electronically increases each day as 
technology advances. With statutory controls it is likely that fewer areas of our 
lives can be kept private. One insightful commentator has explained that: 
"(E]lectronic surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate." Interception 
of a telephone line provides to law enforcement all of the target's com-
I:.unications, whether they are relevant to the investigation or not, rais-
ing concerns about compliance with the particularity requirements in the 
Fourth Amendment and posing the risk of general searches. In addition, 
electronic surveillance involves an on-going intrusion in a protected 
sphere, unlike the traditional search warrant, which authorizes only one 
intrusion, not a series of searches or a continuous surveillance. Officers 
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The test articulated by Harlan in Katz was embraced by 
the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland116 where the Court 
distinguished the privacy expectation it had protected in the 
Katz telephone booth from that of a telephone company's "pen 
register."ll7 The pen register is the telephone company's de-
vice, housed at its facility, which records the dialed telephone 
numbers of a given telephone. 118 At the behest of the govern-
ment, the dialed numbers from Smith's telephone were record-
ed and turned over to the government. 119 
The Court noted that the pen register had a much more 
limited capacity than the listening device used in Katz.120 The 
court explained "[a]lthough most people may be oblivious to a 
pen register's esoteric functions, they presumably have some 
awareness [from notices in phone books] of one common use: to 
aid in the identification of persons making annoying or obscene 
calls. "121 The Court reached the conclusion on little more than 
loose conjecture that Smith probably did not believe the num-
bers he dialed were private. 122 
The Court further dispatched the defendant's constitutional 
must execute a traditional search warrant with dispatch, not over a 
prolonged period of time. If they do not fmd what they are looking for 
in a home or office, they must leave promptly and obtain a separate 
order if they wish to return to search again. Electronic surveillance, in 
contrast, continues around-the-clock. for days or months. Finally, the use-
fulness of electronic surveillance depends on lack of notice to the sus-
pect. 
James X. Dempsey, Communications Privacy in the Digital Age: Revitalizing the 
Federal Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy, 8 ALB.L.J. SCI. & TECH. 65, 70 (1997) 
(quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting» 
(footnotes omitted). 
118 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
117 Smith, 442 U.S. at 741-45; see United States v. Thompson, 936 F.2d 1249 
(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that information obtained from pen register placed on 
telephone line is admissible even if order authorizing it did not comply with stat-
utory requirements). 
118 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
119 Id. at 742. 
120 [d. at 741. 
121 [d. at 742. 
122 [d. The notion that at the time Smith was decided a telephone caller would 
believe that their dialed number was generally available would be inaccurate. 
2006] REFLECTIONS ON STANDING 1121 
claim by concluding that the telephone company was a third 
party to whom the defendant voluntarily exposed the dialed 
number.123 Thus, the Court reasoned, the defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy was not reasonable.l24 This logic, though easy 
to explain on its face, has many intellectual flaws. 
First, it defies logic to suggest that anyone person would 
publish to the public all the calls he made during the course of 
his day.125 The telephone company at that time was a monop-
oly for which no reasonable communication options existed. To 
equate the entity of the telephone company with a careless 
sharing of information with a friend you should not have trust-
ed is not a fair assessment of anyone's reasonable understand-
ing of privacy.126 
As the dissenters appropriately noted, the "prospect of 
unregulated governmental monitoring. . . [is] disturbing even 
to those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals, includ-
ing members of unpopular political organizations or journalists 
with confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid disc1o-
123 Id. at 743-44. 
124 [d. at 744. 
126 If there is any doubt that the government continues to construe Smith with 
any less than the broadest possible scope, the testimony of Deputy Associate 
Attorney General Kevin DiGregory during a congressional hearing on government 
surveillance issues is instructive. DiGregory said: 
[T)he Supreme Court held in Maryland v. Smith [sicl, I believe in 1979, 
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers dialed 
by a telephone because essentially, when someone turns over information 
to a third party like the telephone company, they should not have either 
a subjective or an objective reasonable expectation of privacy in that 
information. 
See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's "Carnivore" Program: Hearing 
Before H. Subcomm. on the Constitution, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Congo 
78 (2000) (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory, Deputy Assoc. Att'y Gen.). 
126 In United States V. Hoffa, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966), the Supreme Court 
held that the use of a government informant who turned out to be a false friend 
was not a violation of Hoffa's constitutional rights. The expectation that we must 
live our life constantly on guard for who we may trust is an unsettling idea that 
the law should be concerned if our society truly values personal privacy. "The 
concept of intrusion holds that a protected zone of privacy exists into which gov-
ernments and others cannot ordinarily and freely intrude for purposes of obtain-
ing information." NIMMER supra note 18, at 16-8. 
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sure of their personal contacts."127 
It is difficult to measure the harm. to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence done by the unartful opinion in Smith. By using 
the reasonable expectation of privacy doctrine as the corner-
stone of its analysis, it improperly applied both the spirit and 
the letter of the test as it reached its decision.12s 
The very nature of the telephone company's pen register 
technology, as a monopolistic database available to the govern-
ment without warrant requirement protection for citizens, 
lowered the analytical fence for a whole generation of new 
technologies not even dreamed possible by the Supreme Court 
at the time of the Smith decision.129 Today, the pen register 
has come home in the form of caller ID technology which we 
now take for granted. lao But how many of us would like any-
12'1 Smith, 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
128 "The analogy in personal information focuses more on the value of nondis-
closure. Privacy rights apply to information not widely and generally known . . . 
for which disclosure might cause loss in terms of harassment, embarrassment, or 
similarly adverse consequences because of the sensitivity of the information to the 
individual." See NIMMER, supra note 18, at 16-6. 
129 See EMORD, supra note 22. 
130 Extending the logic of Smith v. Maryland, courts have held that caller 
identification systems that trap and preserve numbers present no constitutional 
problem because there is no protected privacy interest in the information. For 
example, in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Hamm, 409 S.E.2d 775, 
779-80 (S.C. 1991), the court explained: 
The United States Supreme Court has previously held that callers do 
not have an expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. . . . In 
light of [this) holding . . . that the telephone number of the equipment 
from which a call has been placed is entitled to more privacy than the 
telephone numbers called by someone. The telephone number from which 
a call which is placed . . . is numerical information passed through the 
telephone network, voluntarily transmitted as a result of call placement. 
Caller ID service simply does not violate any right that rises to the level 
of constitutional protection. No fundamental interest is involved in the 
anonymity of a telephone number. 
One court however, has held that under its state wiretapping law, caller ID 
without a blocking mechanism violated privacy rights. Barasch v. Pa. Pub. Util. 
Comm'n, 576 A.2d 79, 89 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990). That court reasoned, "telephone 
service [customers) should not suffer an invasion, erosion or deprivation of their 
privacy rights to protect the unascertainable number of individuals or groups who 
receive nuisance, obscene or annoying telephone calls which can already be traced 
or otherwise dealt with." [d. 
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one, particularly government officials, to have any-time access 
to our caller ID box or our cellular telephone bill complete with 
telephone numbers called and received and our geographical 
location, and time of both received those who we contacted and 
those who tried to contact US.131 Because of the Smith deci-
sion, any information kept in any communication company 
database would not be private simply because the third-party 
vendor collected it on an electronic database. 132 
The troubling consequence of the Smith opinion is that all 
feelings that an individual possesses about privacy are subordi-
nated to the fact of the locations where the private information 
is stored. 133 Critical to the existence of any constitutional 
right under the Smith analysis is the question of "where the 
information lives?".134 Is it in a network system, a home com-
131 See United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1992). 
132 The broadest implication of Smith would suggest that "[e]fforts to apply 
general restrictions on government data collection under concepts of constitutional 
information privacy [will] generally fail." See NIMMER, supra note 18, at 16-24. 
133 Electronic communication from the privacy of one's home has clearly been 
diminished by the Smith approach. As one scholar has explained, traditionally, 
the home enjoyed the greatest degree of constitutional protection: 
Indeed, one could say that the Framers were particularly sensitive about 
safeguarding private homes from governmental intrusion, as the constitu-
tional privilege against unreasonable search and seizure "arose from the 
harsh experience of householders having their doors hammered open by 
magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the crown. . . . " 
There is no doubt that the Framer's envisioned the home as deserving 
special protection from governmental intrusion. The common law devel-
oped strict rules regarding when an officer could forcibly enter a person's 
home to effectuate an arrest or conduct a search. Arrest warrants were 
generally required to enter a home to make an arrest, and warrants 
were obligatory if government officers wanted to enter a home to conduct 
a search. In other words, a warrantless search of a home was out-of 
bounds, so to speak. 
Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth 
Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REv. 895, 933-34 (2002). 
134 One scholar has suggested that the proper question for purposes of deter-
mining whether there has been a constitutional violation of one's privacy interest 
is "whether the papers or personal property [is] mine, whether the house is mine, 
whether the body is mine? If the answer is yes, then one has the right to ex-
clude the government from searching or seizing." Thomas K. Clancy, Coping with 
Technological Change: Kyllo and the Proper Analytical Structure to Measure the 
Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 72 MISS. L.J. 525, 564 (2002) (suggesting 
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puter hard drive or a distant internet connected database? 
Under Smith, it may not matter because all are accessible to a 
third party-the custodian of the database. 135 
In the electronic storage world brought about by the 
growth of personal computing, network systems and the 
internet over the past decade,136 the ramifications of Smith 
suggest a world where the responsibility to prove a constitu-
tional right rests with the person who seeks privacy but cannot 
totally guarantee that all he seeks to keep private is absolutely 
secure. It would be troubling to believe the Founding Father's 
would have found such a narrow view of the Fourth Amend-
ment acceptable. 137 
It is equally troubling to believe that expectations of priva-
cy are dictated solely by the government's ability to intrude 
with improved technology rather than one's legitimate desire to 
keep information private.13B Such formulations would leave 
that although government has the right to reasonable intrusion on privacy, "the 
burden is [always] on the government to justify its actions"). 
135 The Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a New York central computer 
databank containing the names and addresses of all persons obtaining drugs by 
prescription. The Court concluded: 
We are not aware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation 
of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or 
other massive government files . . . . The right to collect and use such 
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statu-
tory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures. 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977). 
136 Courts have ruled that e-mail and subscriber information is not entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection because individuals have no legitimate privacy 
interest. See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001). 
137 One Supreme Court Justice has said: 
[TJhe concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth 
Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful 
government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and other benign 
purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield 
them from the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them 
health and strength to carry on. 
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
136 A grave concern is that one's expectations are dictated by the government's 
ability to intrude. 
The emphasis on subjective expectations poses a further serious threat to 
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only the traditional contents of a private home protected. 
Automobiles have lost almost all privacy.139 They can be 
stopped for even the most trivial of reasons and searched very 
easily after they are stopped.140 Drug detection dogs can be 
brought to the scene of the stops,141 and guests in the vehicle 
have little right to object to any intrusion of their movement 
once the vehicle is pulled over. 142 
IMPRACTICAL STANDING: AVOIDING WASTED TIME AND 
OPPORTUNITY 
One of the problems confronted by courts is the temptation 
to avoid resolving constitutional issues on the basis of the 
standing doctrine when a good deal of effort has been done to 
craft the substantive Fourth Amendment issues.l43 Many 
courts have demonstrated a willingness to avoid reaching the 
merits of a Fourth Amendment issue even when the answer 
fills obvious gaps in a dispute in a case involving multiple co-
defendantsl44 are police search procedures that are likely to 
the vitality of the lFlourth [A)mendment. Repeated invasions by credit 
bureaus, employers, and the like can lead persons to discount most ex-
pectations as unreasonable; individual fears of a loss of privacy then 
become self-fulfilling prophecies. In particular, the government can 
through its actions redefme popular expectations so as to undermine con-
stitutional rights. 
Comment, Legitimate Expectations of PrilJacy Against Unreasonable Searches and 
the "Automatic Standing Rule," 94 HARv. L. REV. 196, 203 (1980) [hereinafter Le-
gitimate Expectations) . 
• 39 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814-815 (1996) (unanimously 
ruling that the police officer's subjective intent is irrelevant to the constitutional 
validity of a traffic stop) . 
• 40 See Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS 
RACE & L. REv. 117 (2001) (detailing the broad powers of police making vehicle 
stops). 
14' See, e.g., United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 637 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(dog sniff not a search because individual did not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in contraband stored in his warehouse) . 
• 42 See Maclin, supra note 140, at 142-43 . 
• 43 See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) ("The 
Standing requirement derives from the constitutional and prudential limits to the 
powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary.") . ... 
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recur over and over again. 
No case illustrates the temptation to avoid ruling on the 
constitutional merits more than Ricks v. State. l45 In Ricks, 
the Baltimore City Police Department pursued a Baltimore 
drug investigation which ultimately resulted in the prosecution 
of three co-defendants. 146 "James A. Ricks, Kevin R. 
DeShields and Van Allen Lewis 0 were identified as part of the 
narcotics distribution organization. ,,147 During the course of 
the investigation the police used "pen registers, physical sur-
veillance, and 'wiretap' orders" to gain information about the 
suspected drug organization.148 
On June 8, 1984, Baltimore City Circuit Court Judge Mil-
ton B. Allen issued an order authorizing the use of an electron-
ic listening and recording devices at 2500 Edgecomb Circle 
North Apartment 1.149 Prior to becoming a judge, Milton Allen 
In a 22-page order, Judge Allen concluded that there was probable cause 
to believe that the controlled dangerous substances laws were being 
violated by individuals using the subject apartment; that the use of the 
audio and video devices was necessary and essential to gain evidence 
leading to the solution of these crimes and the prosecution of all individ-
uals therewith connected. The order specified that evidence could not be 
otherwise obtained since alternate investigative methods had been tried 
and failed and will not succeed in the future, or were too dangerous to 
undertake. 
Ricks v. State, 537 A2d 612, 615 (Md. 1988). 
145 Ricks v. State, 520 A2d 1136 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), affd 537 A2d 612 
(Md. 1988). 




Pursuant to Judge Allen's order, officers entered the air ducts of the 
apartment through the roof, shaved away part of the dry wall and im-
planted a miniature camera, focused on the dining room of the apart-
ment. After several weeks of observation and twenty-five hours of record-
ed video tape, a search warrant was issued to search the apartment on 
August 7, 1984. Both heroin and cocaine were seized. The appellants 
Ricks and DeShields were arrested within the apartment. Appellant Van 
Allen Lewis was also present in the apartment during the raid; he fled 
and was captured shortly thereafter. 
Ricks, 537 A2d at 615. 
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was the first African-American State's Attorney in Baltimore 
City when elected in 1971. Before that time he had spent a 
long, noteworthy career as a criminal defense attorney. ISO 
According to investigation records, the apartment was 
suspected of being a "processing house" or "cut house" for dilut-
ing and packaging drugs for street sale.l5l The men were 
charged with and convicted of possession with the intent to 
manufacture or distribute heroine and cocaine.152 An appeal 
was taken to the State's intermediate appellate court, the 
Court of Special Appeals. That court refused to reach the mer-
its of appellant's Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
claim. 153 
The court appeared to treat the case as one of first impres-
sion in the nation where police obtained a warrant for video 
surveillance in a private residence prior to using wiretaps or 
listening devices being used prior to secret video recording. 154 
Although the court noted that other issues in the case were 
"eclipsed by the magnitude of the video surveillance ques-
tion,"155 it quickly rejected the defendants' claims. The court 
held that the defendants did not demonstrate "a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the searched premises and none of 
their Fourth Amendment rights were violated. ,,156 
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Rakas v. Illi-
1110 See Gn.BERT WARE, FROM THE BLACK BAR: VOICES FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 110-
130 (1976). 
151 Ricks, 520 A.2d at 1138. 
162 ld. 
1153 In their appeal, the appellants argued that the "warrant purporting to 
authorize the surreptitious video surveillance in a private place was invalid under 
Maryland law since the general assembly clearly intended to place controls on all 
manner of secret, electronically aided surveillance by law enforcement in areas 
not in plain view." Id. (court omitted citation). 
164 See id. On earlier occasions in its history, the Supreme Court has upheld 
other intrusive surveillance technologies. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 
129, 135 (1942) (using detectaphone, which captures sound waves placed against 
the wall of an office was not an unconstitutional intrusion because there was no 
trespass). 
1&8 Ricks, 520 A2d at 1138. 
166 Id. at 1140. 
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nois,I57 the court reasoned in its decision that the defendants 
"admitted that they had no proprietary interest"I58 in the 
apartment, but claimed only to be "invited" there. I59 The court 
concluded that merely being invited into a residence was not 
enough to challenge the observation and taping of their images 
inside. ISO 
The defendants appealed that decision to the state's high-
est court, the Maryland Court of Appeals. I61 The court ac-
knowledged that the threshold issue was standing. 162 The 
court, however, examined the facts in greater detail than did 
the court of special appeals. The opinion of Chief Judge Mur-
phy pointed out that at least one of the co-defendants, Ricks, 
had a key to the apartment. I63 
Rather than making a definitive ruling that any of the 
defendants had standing, the court merely "assume[d], without 
deciding, that the appellants had Fourth Amendment standing 
to challenge the search and seizure in this case."I64 
The court, however, rejected the defendants Fourth 
Amendment claims, holding that the State did not need to use 
a less intrusive means of investigation prior to using the highly 
intrusive video recording cameras. 165 Although the Fourth 
157 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
158 Ricks, 520 A2d at 1140. 
158 [d. 
160 [d. The storing of visual images, in general, raises many concerns in soci-
ety. "Video Surveillance cameras quietly scan many workplaces. Neighborhood 
retailers now stock hardware that used to be the stuff of spy novels." Richard 
Lacayo, Nowhere to Hide, TIME, Nov. 11, 1991, at 34. 
161 Ricks, 537 A.2d 612. 
162 [d. at 612. 
163 [d. at 619. 
1114 [d. at 620. 
165 [d. at 621-22. In examjnjng the appellants' Fourth Amendment claim, the 
court of appeals took more care than the intermediate appellate court in detailing 
the nature of the drug investigation and the techniques used prior to seeking the 
video camera. It explained that: 
Pen registers were utilized; long-distance telephone tolls and crimi-
nal history records were monitored; various forms of mobile and fIXed 
surveillance were undertaken, as was use of contact and bumper beepers, 
attempts to obtain codefendant cooperation, to infiltrate the organization, 
to conduct a grand jury investigation, to the issuance of search warrants, 
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Amendment claims offered by the defendants did not prevail, 
that decision was not the most troubling part of this case.166 
Even though state and federal officials were willing to treat the 
defendants as having a right to challenge the searches of the 
apartment, the tentative nature of their approach left open a 
disturbing possibility. 
Should the courts of law be permitted to avoid examining 
the propriety of new technology after long investigations merely 
by relying on the technical objection of standing?167 It appears 
and other investigative methods. 
ld. at 614, n.4. 
The Court further related the alleged justifications for the more intrusive 
video surveillance technique: 
Notwithstanding the extensive and lengthy investigation . . . which uti-
lized or considered utilizing all manner and means of conventional and 
innovative techniques, the application recited that the police were unable 
to determine the organization's method of interstate supply and the 
location of other places where the illegal drugs were stored before distri-
bution. The application explained that the organization's members were 
so disciplined in their speech as possibly to result in failure of intercep-
tion of oral communications by audio devices; and that authority was 
therefore necessary to install a video tape camera within the apartment 
to observe the various aspects of the illegal enterprise. The application 
recited that a single surreptitious entry to install both electronic devices 
was essential to avoid detection and to minimize the danger to those 
authorized to enter the apartment to install the video camera and bug-
ging device. 
According to the affiants, additional evidence was needed to dem-
onstrate sufficient probable cause to arrest the high echelon members of 
the organization, who were the primary targets of their surveil-
lance . . . . [Tlhe affiants related that an authorized search of the apart-
ment would not reveal the source or method of the organization's drugs 
and distribution, nor would it reveal sufficient information to destroy the 
organization; moreover, an authorized search of the subject apartment at 
that time would make it impossible to locate other of the organization's 
stash houses. 
ld. at 614-15 (footnote omitted). 
166 See Thomas M. Messana, Note, Ricks v. State: Big Brother has Arrived in 
Maryland, 48 MD. L. REv. 435 (1989) (discussing concerns about the Ricks opin-
ions). 
167 In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 676 (1973), an environmental 
group sued to keep railroad freight charges low which it believed would reduce 
the amount of litter in national parks because train traffic promoted more recy-
cling. It claimed that its group members "breathe[dl the air" and "used" the 
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that even the two state court opinions, acknowledging the im-
portant constitutional questions raised, did not deter a half-
hearted approach to deciding the question. The courts should 
have fully embraced their responsibility to get the question 
answered so that other relevant privacy stakeholders could 
respond to the outcome. 16S 
In cases where new technology is confronted in the courts, 
the substantive issues need to be immediately addressed so 
that the court process can be completed and the legislature can 
respond if it chooses. Failure of the courts to make clear that 
they will reach the merits of cases involving new technology 
leaves the legal path to address privacy issues exceedingly 
unclear. 169 
Such uncertainty creates an atmosphere where more intru-
sive technology can be developed without adequate privacy 
safeguards. Ricks presents a constitutional close call. Although 
the court of appeals reached the privacy claim, its hesitation 
could be interpreted as a signal by other courts that avoiding 
parks. Id. at 678, 682. The Court concluded this group did have standing because 
it would mean that some "widespread government actions would be questioned by 
nobody." Id. at 688. 
168 As technology increases the ease of intrusion, courts should be more willing 
rather than less willing to reach the merits of search and seizure questions not 
only in our homes but everywhere. "As society has evolved and our li~es have 
become more mobile, as we spend more and more of our waking hours away from 
home, there may be even more reason to prize our right to preserve secrecy out-
side dwellings and to be concerned with novel perils generated by scientific and 
technological progress." See James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of 
the Fourth Ameruiment: A Tale of Two Futures, 72 MIsS. L.J. 317, 425 n.386 
(2002). 
169 
An unresolved issue in the evolution of privacy law is when government 
data systems should be protected as a private recourse and when they 
should be treated as a public location in respect to individual privacy 
interests. 
Against what interest does the property right fail? . . . Thus, for 
example, in applying for services, credit, or government benefits, privacy 
interests typically do not permit the individual to elect not to disclose 
information pertinent to the person making the decision about eligibility 
for such items. 
NIMMER, supra note 18, at 16-7. 
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the privacy merits by relying on standing is an acceptable al-
ternative.170 The procedural tool of standing cannot be used to 
avoid the court's role as a first responder in the constitutional 
structure to protect us from new, intrusive and sometimes 
secret search and seizure technology.l7l 
STANDING ON LoGICAL SOLUSIONS 
Many critics of the Warren court and its liberal Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence have also embraced the adoption of 
stringent standing rules.172 The all or nothing exclusionary 
rule sanction has encouraged courts to use any device to avoid 
imposing its strict requirements.173 Concern about national 
security and awareness of increasing terrorist activity in the 
United States will likely make police investigative conduct seen 
as more reasonable.174 The catastrophe of September 11, 2001 
has made our nation painfully aware of the risks inherent in 
free society. 175 
The benefit of a free society demands careful attention to 
the rule of law. Furthermore, if we are to continue to have an 
exclusionary rule, consistency and clarity in its application are 
absolutely critical in our high technology world.176 The 
jurisprudence reasonable expectation of privacy as it has cur-
rently been formulated by the Supreme Court is inadequate to 
address the current search and seizure landscape.177 
110 For example, the Supreme Court has held that a court is required to in-
quire whether the police action was in fact a seizure before determining whether 
there was a Fourth Amendment violation. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295 (1999). 
171 The Supreme Court has already demonstrated a willingness to allow tech-
nology such as tracking devices to evade constitutional scrutiny. See United States 
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that placing a beeper type location 
device without a warrant in a barrel of contraband is not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment). 
112 See, e.g., O'BRIEN, supra note 84, at 164-69 (discussing the Warren Court's 
standing requirements). 
173 See BORK, supra note 12, at 104. 
17. See Gibeaut, supra note 33, at 35. 
175 1d. at 32. 
176 See Dempsey, supra note 115, at 88-89. 
m One critic of broad government surveillance asserts that: 
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A change in substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine is not 
the so much the issue as is the question of how will emerging 
new surveillance technology be evaluated as reasonable or 
unreasonable under traditional Fourth Amendment doc-
trine. 178 
Fortunately, a few adjustments to the current approach to 
standing will provide an opportunity for clear judicial guidance 
by removing barriers to ruling on the Fourth Amendment mer-
its in selected cases in certain high technology areas.179 
The history of intelligence in this country is dominated by a system-
atic invention, usurpation, and abuse of the power to engage in it. In 
American public life we almost invariably reduce power conflicts to is-
sues of due process, of individual rights; the one is typically abstract, 
and the other more accessible because it is specific and "human." . . . 
But one can hardly sweep under the rug the wealth of evidence 
that intelligence in this country has emerged and spread into a formida-
ble instrument of control simply as the result of a series of power grabs. 
For more than three decades J. Edgar Hoover claimed that the FBI had 
been entrusted by a presidential directive of September 1939 with an 
open-ended intelligence mission unrelated to law enforcement. 
FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 7 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1980). 
178 "The Fourth Amendment's touchstone is reasonableness, and a search's 
reasonableness is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which 
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it 
is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." United States 
v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 113 (2001) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 
300 (1999». 
179 Professor Arthur Miller, in a prophetic statement about a quarter of a 
century ago, framed the challenge of the courts' role in privacy protection and the 
challenges that courts and society would face as we anticipated the promise of 
the high technology age. He wrote: 
The notion that the courts will recognize a general principle requiring 
data handlers to treat personal information as confidential or will de-
clare that file keepers owe a fiduciary duty to file subjects seems to be 
wishful thinking. Nor is it realistic to think that a pledge of confidenti-
ality can be secured on a contractual basis. In most situations involving 
data extraction, the individual is in no position to demand a promise to 
this effect. Of course, the courts may change their attitude when the 
potentialities of the computer become apparent. But to wait for the 
courts to create common-law obligations and impose them on information 
extractors, processors, transmitters, and users for the benefit of data 
subjects will require the patience of Job and may prove to be no more 
fruitful than agitating for the expansion of the common-law privacy ac-
tion. Time is a luxury personal privacy cannot afford and the glacial 
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First, the concept of automatic standing,180 once aban-
doned needs to be revisited for searches involving the capture 
of a person's image by any means-electronic, photographic or 
digital. 181 It should not matter how the image was obtained, 
because it would defy logic to suggest a person does not have 
an interest in the interception, recording, or storing of their 
image by a government entity .182 Such interest in recorded 
image has long been taken for granted in tort law. 183 Actions 
for invasion of privacy and actions for commercial use of one's 
private image have been recognized even prior to the age of 
high technology surveillance. 
The concept of reasonable expectation of privacy will still 
by applied by considering the degree to which a person has 
knowingly exposed themselves to the public. l84 The objective 
test that has traditionally been applied to such government 
searches need not be abandoned. For example, most public 
travel in open spaces easily would be constitutionally permitted 
because of courts' traditional "open fields" analysis.185 
movement of legal doctrine is inappropriate for the problem at hand. 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AsSAULT ON PRIvACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND DOS-
SIERS 220 (1971). 
180 Some states have adopted automatic standing rules in order to make chal-
lenging searches and seizures less burdensome. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 440 A.2d 
1311, 1320 (N.J. 1981). 
I.' New forms of surveillance technology that actually record facial images and 
compare features to other persons located in computer databases have been in-
creasingly used by law enforcement. See Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial 
Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL.INTERDISC. L.J. 
295, 303-08 (1999) (describing digital and biometrics technology). 
'82 Public use of intrusive video technology is growing. See M.J. Zuckerman, 
Chances Are, Somebody's Watching You, USA TODAY, Nov. 30, 2000, at 01.A (de-
scribing a forty million dollar surveillance center using 110 remote control camer-
as in the suburbs of Washington). 
183 However, when one goes out in public the interest in that privacy is also 
diminished in tort claims. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 
391-92 (1960) (stating that the tort of invasion of privacy is not implicated when 
a photograph of a person is taken in public "since this amounts to nothing more 
than making a record, not differing essentially from a full description, of a public 
sight which anyone present would be free to see"). 
'84 See Legitimate Expectations, supra note 138, at 203. 
186 Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (holding unanimously that 
revenue agents who observed illegal liquor trafficking from an open field violated 
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It is my view, however, that the discussion of standing that 
sometimes arises from search and seizure matters involving 
recording a person's image may obscure or eliminate court's 
analysis of the reasonableness of the government's surveillance 
technique that led to one's recorded image. Such an adjustment 
would not unduly hamper the efforts of law enforcement to 
"ferret out crime"l86 with improved surveillance technology. It 
would, however, require accountability when new technology is 
used, because courts would be encouraged by the automatic 
standing rule to reach the merits in these alleged intrusion 
cases.187 
It is obvious that technology will always be created far 
faster than society's ability to evaluate or regulate it with legis-
lation or by court rule. This being the case, it is desirable that 
courts should confront the new enforcement tool on a case-by-
case basis and are in a peculiarly good position to be gatekeep-
ers of the reasonableness of these technologies. 
If courts are encouraged to rule on each and every matter 
by applying an automatic standing approach, government law 
enforcement agencies will be required to describe the use of 
new, more invasive technology if they intend to introduce its 
fruit as evidence.188 The legislature may respond with appro-
priate legislation after it is made aware by court proceedings 
that new technology has been utilized. If the legislature does 
not respond, courts will continue to formulate policy as to rea-
sonableness and use traditional application of precedent and 
no constitutionally protected interest). 
186 illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004). 
181 See generally Jose Felipe Anderson, Accountability Solutions in the Consent 
Search and Seizure Wasteland, 79 NEB. L. REV. 711 (2000) (arguing for more 
police accountability in searching and seeking confessions). 
186 One scholar has gone so far as to suggest that, "[iJn this area of rapid 
technological change, the freedom to be unnoticed in public, and its associated 
benefits, will disappear unless a right to public anonymity is recognized and en-
forced." Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places 
and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MIss. L.J. n4, 217, 314-15 (2002) (arguing that 
the Fourth Amendment should be construed to recognize a right to public ano-
nymity as a part of privacy expectations because "government surveillance of our 
innocent public activities that are not meant for public consumption is neither ex-
pected nor to be condoned"). 
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stare decisis as courts examine the propriety of government 
intrusion. 189 
A practice that encourages, rather than discourage, these 
emerging technologies to be submitted to judicial evaluation 
better serves the orderly development of the law. Applying an 
automatic standing rule regarding such searches is both logical 
and practical. Some states have already imposed automatic 
standing rules through the legislative process.190 It may be 
that even due process would require that standing be granted 
to support meaningful review of the means by which the gov-
ernment obtained a person's image. To do otherwise might 
allow privacy rights to be violated by supporting the rights 
without meaningful remedies. 
SMITH V. MARYLAND: OUTDATED BEFORE ITS TIME 
The application of Smith v. Maryland191 to modern tech-
nology needs to be carefully reexamined. It was a flawed deci-
sion from the day it was announced, but as time and technolo-
gy have advanced, it has become abundantly clear that the Su-
preme Court's heavy reliance on third party access to databases 
as undermining the expectation of privacy has created a major 
gap in privacy protection.192 At a minimum, automatic stand-
189 Someone must be the monitor of fIrst instance as new, more intrusive, 
technology is used by law enforcement; but do courts have any real impact on 
how government agents intrude? "Some suggest that the police will always fmd 
their own ways to evade constitutional rules; others maintain that even in the 
best of circumstances the Supreme Court is just too distant from the day- to-day 
decisions of the policeman ... to have any systematic effect on police behavior." 
See HORWITZ, supra note 85, at 96. 
190 See, e.g., State v. Culotta, 343 So. 2d 977 (La. 1976) ("Any person adversely 
affected by a search or seizure . . . shall have standing to raise its legality in the 
appropriate court." (quoting LA. CONST. art. I, § 5». 
191 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
192 "Although the conflicting interests involved are compelling, the paramount 
function of national security is to vigilantly protect the ideals embodied by the 
very same Amendment that the standard violates. Those ideals cannot be whittled 
away in today's desire to defend the very same values that provide for our securi-
ty." David Hardin, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of 
the USA PATRIOT Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 291, 345 (2003). 
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ing to challenge evidence collected by the government in remote 
information databases needs to be recognized. 
The modern era of easy information storage and retrieval 
has created a privacy crisis in which it is impossible to know 
who has the power to transmit or store information that a 
person might seek to keep private.193 The government has a 
responsibility to investigate crime and protect citizens. Obvi-
ously, the government·must legitimately invade private mat-
ters and collect that information from diverse sources,194 but 
increased capability to intrude requires increased accountabili-
ty. If the facts support their investigative needs, they should 
not fear an impartial magistrate's review. 195 
Emergency situations involving terrorism, hostages, or 
circumstances of imminent danger would obviously create a 
need to intrude on a wide range of records,196 but there is no 
need to prevent those whose records have been obtained from 
electronic storage from litigating the government's justification 
and process for obtaining the data. 
I do not suggest that improving investigative capability is 
193 It has been argued that a "good society must have its hiding places-its 
protected crannies for the soul. Under the pitiless eye of safety the soul will 
wither." Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE 
L.J. 1161, 1172 (1966). 
190 Law enforcement obviously needs data in order to investigate and prosecute 
crime. High technology has proven particularly useful in the prosecution of offend-
ers engaged in child pornography. See Jason Krause, Can Anyone Stop Internet 
Porn?: Courts Have Shot Down Laws Protecting Kids from Obscenity Online. Is 
Cyberspace Suited for a Virtual Privacy Wrapper?, 88 A.B.A. J. 56 (2002). 
19. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967), the Supreme 
Court said: 
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a 
grave concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses 
to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the 
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a 
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or govern-
ment enforcement agent. 
The key is to insert a disinterested magistrate between the govern-
ment official and the citizen to give the right against unreasonable 
search and seizure meaning. 
[d. at 532-33. 
198 See Milligan, supra note 181, at 297. 
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a constitutional evil. I do not wish to be misunderstood to de-
sire fashioning rules that benefit defendants simply because of 
the conservative leanings of the Rehnquist COurt197 or to re-
capture the nostalgia of the often defense-friendly Warren 
COurt.198 Law enforcement should be permitted to do its job 
based on articulable facts and reasonable need. Emerging tech-
nology requires that government be prepared to articulate their 
need to intrude as their ability to intrude increases. 199 
Privacy issues, particularly as they relate to stored elec-
tronic data bases, need to be examined by legislatures for ade-
quate controls.20o In the meantime, the Supreme Court should 
place responsibility for advances in more intrusive technology 
on the government that seeks to use it. The court should not 
apply the reasonable expectation of privacy approach to elec-
tronic databases in the same manner as it is applied to the 
protection of abandoned trash.201 Medical,202 genetic,203 
and financial data204 should be afforded greater care from 
19'/ See generally Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist Court: 
Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273 (1987) (discussing Justice 
Rehnquist's views and the effect he will have on the Court). 
198 See generally Fred Gilbert Bennett, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Review: 
An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 UCLA L. REV. 
1129 (1973) (discussing the Warren Court's exclusionary rule and arguing for its 
expansion). 
199 One insightful commentator has noted that "technological advances pose the 
challenges that always beset the constitutional enterprise-those involved with 
trying to create flxed rules, or at least a workable rule of law, for a changing 
world.~ Susan Bandes, Power, Privacy, and Thermal Imaging, 86 MINN. L. REv. 
1379, 1383 (2002). 
200 See DOHERTY, supra note 29, at 51-52. 
201 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39-40 (holding that one does not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacY in abandoned trash placed at the curb). 
202 Se!! Lawrence O. Gostin, Health Information Privaey, 80 CORNELL L.REV. 
451 (1995) (discussing generally the confldentiality of health records). 
203 See Richard C. Turkington, Medical Record Confidentiality Law, Scientific 
Research and Data Collection in the Information Age, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 113 
(1997). 
2.. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (fmding no reasonable 
expectation of privacY in fmancial information contained at the defendant's bank 
because a "depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the 
information will be conveyed by that person to the [glovernment.~ (citing United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971))). 
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government scrutiny and the presumptions for warrants to 
access information should be respected. 
The everyday use of cellular telephone communication205, 
e-mail and other information sharing and communication tech-
nology in an increasingly paperless world requires that we 
constantly monitor new forms of intrusion.206 The recent use 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Carnivore program for 
reading e-mail is an interesting example.207 The technology 
for reading e-mail is actually physically attached to the infor-
mation service provider's equipment.208 This technology was 
not even on the congressional radar screen until after it had 
long been in investigative use.209 Automatic standing rules 
would have engaged court review of the technology as soon as 
the government would have attempted to use the evidence 
obtained against anyone in any court.210 Assuring more 
prompt litigation of the reasonableness of the use of such tech-
nology will promote public confidence that law enforcement will 
205 Cellular telephones have less constitutional protection than a standard tele-
phone that was contemplated in Katz. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 
171 (5th Cir. 1992). 
206 
The explosion of data collection on individual, he said gloomily, has 
reached the point where it is very difficult for us even to begin to estab-
lish any kind of control over our privacy. . . . The hazard is multiplied 
when information on individuals that is collected for one purpose turns 
up being used for some other purpose. This inevitably happens when you 
get a pooling of data from agencies, with multi-access terminals. 
VANCE PACKARD, THE PEoPLE SHAPERS 151-52 (1977). 
2m "Carnivore is '[e)ssentially a personal computer stuffed with specialized 
software, [which) represents a new twist in the federal government's fight to 
sustain its snooping powers in the Internet age.' The Wall Street Journal also 
reported that Carnivore 'can scan millions of e-mails a second. . . . '" Trenton C. 
Haas, Carnivore and the Fourth Amendment, 34 CONN. L. REv. 261 (2001) (alter-
ation in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's 
Wiretaps to Scan E-mail Spark Concern, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3). 
208 "The Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . asserts that Carnivore represents 
the FBrs latest effort to keep abreast of the rapidly changing demands of law en-
forcement. . . . It stresses that Carnivore does not collect all of the data traveling 
over a network." Id. at 262 (footnote omitted). 
209 See supra note 128, at 31. 
210 See, e.g., Culotta, 343 So. 2d at 981-82. 
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abide by its dual responsibility to investigate crime and respect 
constitutional rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 211 The 
spirit of the Founding Fathers requires no less.212 
CONCLUSION 
Concerns over national security as we enter the new centu-
ry have caused us to reconsider our crime fighting techniques. 
The rapid increase of technology has created uncertainty about 
what constitutional protection citizens really possess.213 Inno-
vative use of automatic standing rules will help unclutter the 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It will also help ease the 
confusion created by the Supreme Court's short-sighted prece-
dent in Smith v. Maryland. The rapid growth of technology at a 
pace that state and federal legislatures could not hope to ever 
211 "The preservation of freedom requires a positive and continuing commit-
ment." ARTHuR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF 
FREEDOM 189 (1949). 
21. Professor Lawrence Tribe reminds us: 
As Sophocles said, nobody has a more sacred obligation to obey the 
law than those who make and enforce it. 
[T)hose who wrote the Constitution's limitations on how suspects 
may be pursued obviously knew that taking those limits seriously-that 
is, obeying them rather than flouting them-would necessarily prevent 
some guilty people from being apprehended and convicted. 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GoD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 8 (1985). 
213 On commentator has explained that: 
For a number of reasons, discernment of the relationship between 
technology and the threshold of the Fourth Amendment is an exceedingly 
difficult undertaking. The novel, sometimes ingenious, devices that give 
rise to constitutional questions that were unknown to and unanticipated 
by those who drafted the Constitution. The conduct these mechanisms 
make possible often bears little or no ostensible resemblance to the phys-
ical intrusions that troubled our ancestors. Nonetheless, the dramatic 
increases in human capacities they afford can threaten the very same 
privacy interests that are violated by physical intrusions. Moreover, tech-
nological tools sometimes pose novel threats to privacy by enabling offi-
cials to gain access to potentially confidential information that was whol-
ly unreachable in an earlier age. 
James J. Tomkovicz, Technology and the Threshold of the Fourth Amendment: A 
Tale of Two Futures, 72 MISS. L.J. 317, 445 (2002). 
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keep pace with is a problem that becomes a greater concern 
with each passing day.214 A reasonable balance should be 
struck between law enforcement's effective use of new tech-
nology to investigate crime and the right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Of course, law enforcement should have 
available the best tools of technology to stop crime.215 
Accountability, however, for the use of those tools needs to 
be maintained.216 Safety and security are a greater concern 
than ever before. We should always be mindful of the need to 
be secure from both terrorism and more traditional types of 
criminal behavior. 
Law enforcement needs the best tools to investigate 
crime.217 Their power, however, is not unlimited, nor should it 
214 See Patricia Mell, Big Brother at the Door: Balancing National Security 
with Privacy Under the USA PATRIOT Act, 80 DENY. U. L. REV. 375 (2002). 
21. The use of drug testing technology, for example, has reached into the 
nation's high schools. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) 
(validating drug testing in high schools even without suspicion). 
216 The serious consequences of error in a world dominated by high technology 
law enforcement cannot be overstated. In the very common example of police 
record checks during vehicle stops, the person stopped has no choice but to rely 
on the accuracy of the information contained in the police database. One court 
considered the importance of deterring even innocent neglect of inaccurate infor-
mation that leads to arrests. People v. Joseph, 470 N.E.2d 1303, 1305-06 (ill. 
App. Ct. 1984). In refusing to extend a good faith exception to faulty information 
in a computer search relied on by police, the Illinois Supreme Court explained: 
The situation in the instant case reflects a matter within the re-
sponsibility and control of police authorities who failed to update their 
records to accurately reflect defendant's current status. In this age of 
computerization, we do not believe it would be appropriate to sanction 
the arrest here, thereby allowing law enforcement authorities to rely on 
an error of their own making. Moreover, it is our opinion that the good-
faith reliance of the arresting officer in acting upon information provided 
to him through police channels, cannot overcome the intrusion made 
upon defendant's lFlourth [Almendment rights. 
Id. at 1306 (citation omitted); see also Ott v. State, 600 A.2d Ill, 118-19 (1992) 
(rmding that the State failed to establish that a delay of seven days over a week-
end and holiday in removing outstanding arrest warrant from police computer 
records was reasonable). 
217 The Supreme Court has, in some circumstances, approved certain law en-
forcement techniques involving technological advances to aid police in crime con-
trol. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (approving high-tech 
police observation of a residence from an airplane under the plain view doctrine). 
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be unchecked.218 The courts have a responsibility to under-
stand its role as the first stop on the road to clarification of the 
law which guards our privacy and our precious way of life. 
Clarification of our approach to standing is one of the impor-
tant ways we can maintain a proper security and privacy bal-
ance in a high technology age. 
U8 Professor Yale Kamisar correctly observes: 
[Tlhe Fourth Amendment may plausibly be viewed as the center-
piece of a free, democratic society. All other freedoms presuppose that 
lawless police action have been restrained. What good is freedom of 
speech or freedom of religion or any other freedom if law enforcement 
officers have unfettered power to violate a person's privacY and liberty 
when he sits in his home or drives his car or walks the streets? 
Yale Kamisar, The Fourth Amendment and Its Exclusionary Rule, THE CHAMPION, 
Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 20-21. 
